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Abstract
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a
number of real-world applications bordering on mathematical optimization and game
theory. While the single-follower case has been investigated since the inception of
bilevel programming with the seminal work of von Stackelberg, results for the case
with multiple followers are only sporadic and not many computationally affordable
methods are available. In this work, we consider Stackelberg games with two or more
followers who play a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium once the leader has committed
to a (pure or mixed) strategy, focusing on normal-form and polymatrix games. As cus-
tomary in bilevel programming, we address the two extreme cases where, if the leader’s
commitment originates more Nash equilibria in the followers’ game, one which either
maximizes (optimistic case) or minimizes (pessimistic case) the leader’s utility is
selected. First, we show that, in both cases and when assuming mixed strategies, the
optimization problem associated with the search problem of finding a Stackelberg
equilibrium is NP-hard and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP . We then consider
different situations based on whether the leader or the followers can play mixed strate-
gies or are restricted to pure strategies only, proposing exact nonconvex mathematical
programming formulations for the optimistic case for normal-form and polymatrix
games. For the pessimistic problem, which cannot be tackled with a (single-level)
mathematical programming formulation, we propose a heuristic black-box algorithm.
All the methods and formulations that we propose are thoroughly evaluated compu-
tationally.
Keywords Bilevel programming · Game theory · Stackelberg games · Equilibrium
computation
Mathematics Subject Classification 91A10 · 91A65 · 91A90 · 90C26
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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1 Introduction
Leader-follower (or Stackelberg) games model the interaction between rational agents
(or players) when a hierarchical decision-making structure is in place. Considering, for
simplicity, the two-player case, Stackelberg games model situations where an agent
(the leader) plays first and a second agent (the follower) plays right after them, after
observing the strategy the leader has chosen.
The number of real-world problems where a leader-follower (or Stackelberg) struc-
ture can be identified is extremely large. This is often the case in the security domain
(An et al. 2011; Kiekintveld et al. 2009), where a defender, aiming to protect a set of
valuable targets from the attackers, plays first, while the attackers, acting as followers,
make their move only after observing the leader’s defensive strategy. Other notewor-
thy cases are interdiction problems (Caprara et al. 2016; Matuschke et al. 2017), toll
setting problems (Labbé and Violin 2016), network routing problems (Amaldi et al.
2013) and (singleton) congestion games (Castiglioni et al. 2018; Marchesi et al. 2018).
While, since the seminal work of von Stackelberg (2010), the case with a single
leader and a single follower has been widely investigated, only a few results are known
for the case with multiple followers and not many computationally affordable methods
are available to solve the corresponding equilibrium-finding problem.
In this paper, we focus on the fundamental case of single-leader multi-follower
games with a finite number of actions per player where the overall game can be
represented as a normal-form or polymatrix game—the latter is of interest as it plays
an important role in a number of applications such as in the security domain, where
the defender may need to optimize against multiple uncoordinated attackers solely
interested in damaging the leader. Throughout the paper, we assume the setting where
the (two or more) followers play simultaneously in a noncooperative way, for which
it is natural to assume that, after observing the leader’s play (either as a strategy or
as an action), the followers would reach a Nash equilibrium (NE) (see Shoham and
Leyton-Brown (2008) for a thorough exposition of this equilibrium concept). We refer
to an equilibrium in such games as leader-follower Nash equilibrium (LFNE).
As it is typical in bilevel programming, we study two extreme cases: the optimistic
one where, if the leader’s commitment originates more NE in the followers’ game,
one which maximizes the leader’s utility is selected, and the pessimistic one where an
equilibrium which minimizes the leader’s utility is chosen.
In particular, the leader’s utility at an optimistic equilibrium corresponds to the
largest utility the leader may get assuming the best case in which the followers would
(somehow) end up playing a Nash equilibrium which maximizes the leader’s utility.
Differently, the leader’s utility at a pessimistic equilibrium corresponds to a utility
value the leader could always get independently of the followers’ behavior. From this
perspective, a risk-taking leader would play according to an optimistic equilibrium,
whereas a risk-averse leader would play according to a pessimistic equilibrium. For
more types of solution concepts related to these two, we refer the reader to Alves and
Antunes (2016).
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The original contributions of our work are as follows.1 First, we illustrate that the
optimization problem associated with the search problem of computing an LFNE in
mixed strategies when the followers play an NE which either maximizes or minimizes
the leader’s utility is NP-hard and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP . After casting
the general problem with mixed-strategy commitments in bilevel terms, we propose
different nonlinear and nonconvex single-level mathematical programming formu-
lations for the optimistic case, suitable for state-of-the-art spatial-branch-and-bound
solvers. For the pessimistic case, which does not admit a single-level mathematical
programming reformulation of polynomial size, we propose a heuristic method based
on the combination of a spatial-branch-and-bound solver with a black-box algorithm.
We also briefly investigate (easier) variants of the problem obtained when restricting
either the leader or the followers to pure-strategy commitments. We conclude by pro-
viding a thorough experimental evaluation of our techniques on a (normal-form and
polymatrix) test bed generated with GAMUT (Nudelman et al. 2004), also encom-
passing some structured games, employing different solvers: BARON, SCIP, CPLEX,
SNOPT and RBFOpt. (The latter is used for black-box optimization).
2 Notation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents. For each p ∈ N , we denote by Ap the agent’s
set of actions, with m p = |Ap|. For each agent p ∈ N , we denote by x p ∈ [0, 1]m p ,
with eT x p = 1 (where e is the all-one vector), their strategy vector (or strategy, for
short). Each component xap of x p represents the probability by which agent p plays
action a ∈ Ap. We call x p a vector of pure strategies if x p ∈ {0, 1}m p or of mixed
strategies in the general case. We denote a strategy profile, i.e., the collection of the
strategies each agent plays, by x = (x1, . . . , xn).
For each agent p ∈ N , we define their utility function as u p : [0, 1]m1 × · · · ×
[0, 1]mn → R. A strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an NE if and only if, for each
agent p ∈ N , u p(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ u p(x ′1, . . . , x ′n) for every strategy profile x ′ where
x ′q = xq for all q ∈ N\{p} and x ′p = x p. (This corresponds to assuming that no
unilateral deviations would take place.) We consider two game classes: normal-form
(NF) and polymatrix (PM).
For NF games (see Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) for a reference), we let
Up ∈ Rm1×···×mn denote, for each agent p ∈ N , their (multi-dimensional) utility
(or payoff) matrix where each component U a1,...,anp denotes the utility of agent p
when all the agents play actions a1, . . . , an . Given a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn), the
expected utility of agent p ∈ N is equal to the multi-linear function u p(x1, . . . , xn) =
xTp (Up ·
∏
q∈N\{p} xq).
For PM games (see Yanovskaya (1968) for a reference), we have a utility matrix
Upq ∈ Rm p×mq per pair of agents p, q ∈ A. Given a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn),
the expected utility of agent p is equal to the bilinear function u p(x1, . . . , xn) =∑
q∈N\{p} xTp Upq xq .
1 Some parts of the paper were presented at a preliminary stage in Basilico et al. (2016) and Basilico et al.
(2017).
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We remark that, while in the NF case the degree of the polynomial corresponding
to an agent’s expected utility is equal to the number of agents, it is always equal to 2
in the PM case, independently of the number of agents involved. The computational
impact of this property will be discussed in the paper.
3 Previous works
Since the original work of Nash (1950), the problem of computing Nash equilibria in
multi-player games (without a leader) has attracted a large interest—see the monograph
(von Stengel 2010 and Chen and Deng 2006; Conitzer and Sandholm 2008) where
the complexity of the problem is addressed. For more details on noncooperative game
theory, we refer the interested reader to Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008).
Most of the game-theoretic investigations on Stackelberg games have, to the best
of our knowledge, mainly addressed the case of a single follower. In such setting, it
is known that the single follower can play a pure strategy without loss of generality,
i.e., that there always is a pure strategy by which they can maximize their utility and
that the optimization problem associated with the search problem of computing an
equilibrium is easy with complete information (von Stengel and Zamir 2010), while
it becomes NP-hard for Bayesian games (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006). Algorithms
are proposed in Conitzer and Sandholm (2006).
For what concerns Stackelberg games with more than two players, some works
have investigated the case with multiple leaders and a single follower; see Leyffer and
Munson (2010). For the problem involving a single leader and multiple followers (the
one on which we focus in this paper), only a few results are available. It is known,
for instance, that an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time if the followers
play a correlated equilibrium in the optimistic case (Conitzer and Korzhyk 2011) (see
Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008 for more detail on correlated equilibria), whereas
the associated optimization problem is NP-hard if they play sequentially one at a
time (as in a classical Stackelberg game with many players) (Conitzer and Sandholm
2006).
4 Problem statements, bilevel perspective and computational
complexity
In this section, we formalize the problem that we address in the paper, cast it in bilevel
terms and investigate its computational complexity and approximability.
4.1 Problem statements
In formal terms, the two main versions of the problem of computing an LFNE that we
tackle in this paper, optimistic (O-LFNE) and pessimistic (P-LFNE), are defined as
follows:
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O-LFNE: Given an n-agent game with n ≥ 3, find a strategy vector δ for the
leader such that, after committing, the largest leader’s utility over all the NE in
the followers’ game parameterized by δ is as large as possible.
P-LFNE: Given an n-agent game with n ≥ 3, find a strategy vector δ for the
leader such that, after committing, the smallest leader’s utility over all the NE
in the followers’ game parameterized by δ is as large as possible.
When notationally convenient, we will refer to an either optimistic or pessimistic
LFNE as O/P-LFNE.
We will distinguish between the cases where either the leader or the followers
are restricted or not to pure strategies, considering four cases: leader in mixed and
followers in mixed (LMFM), leader in pure and followers in mixed (LPFM), leader in
mixed and followers in pure (LMFP), and leader in pure and followers in pure (LPFP).
In the general (mixed) case, we assume that the leader commits to a strategy, i.e., to
a distribution of probability according to which they (the leader) select their action,
and that, while the followers can observe the distribution chosen by the leader, they
(the followers) cannot observe its realization (i.e., the action the leader plays). This
is the case in, e.g., security games. The case in which the leader’s strategy is pure is
the converse one in which the leader’s play is completely observable by the followers.
The assumption behind the followers playing mixed strategies is the same as in games
without a leader (e.g., one can consider repeated games in which the leader has to
commit to a single strategy before the game starts, whereas the followers can, at each
iteration, draw a different action profile from their distribution of choice, thus playing
mixed strategies).
For the sake of presentation, in the remainder of the paper we assume n = 3 (one
leader, two followers). We remark that our results can be adapted to any n. In Sect. 9,
we will indeed report on computational experiments carried out for games with more
than two followers.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the last agent (the third), whom we
relabel as agent , takes the role of leader. All the other agents (the followers) are
compactly denoted by the set F = N\{}. When n = 3, F = {1, 2}. For all f ∈ F ,
we define f ′ := F\{ f }. We also denote x (the strategy vector of the leader) by δ and
x1, x2 (the strategy vectors of the followers) by ρ1, ρ2. For each p ∈ N , we let Δp
be the simplex of strategies of player p, i.e., the set of nonnegative vectors δ, ρ1 or ρ2
summing to 1.
4.2 Bilevel programming perspective
Computing an O/P-LFNE amounts to solving a bilevel programming problem.
In the optimistic case, we can compute an O-LFNE by solving the following prob-
lem:
(O-LFNE) max
(ρ1,ρ2,δ)∈
Δ1×Δ2×Δ
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 δ
k (1a)
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s.t. ρ1 ∈ argmax
ρ1∈Δ1
{ ∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 δ
k
}
(1b)
ρ2 ∈ argmax
ρ2∈Δ2
{ ∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 δ
k
}
. (1c)
Due to Constraints (1b)–(1c), the second-level problems call for a pair (ρ1, ρ2) of
followers’ strategies forming an NE in the followers’ game induced by the strategy
δ ∈ Δ chosen by the leader in the first level. Note that, due to the definition of NE, the
pair (ρ1, ρ2) is an NE in the game induced by δ if and only if ρ1 (resp., ρ2) maximizes
player 1’s (resp., player 2’s) utility when assuming that player 2 (resp., player 1) plays
ρ2 (resp., ρ1). Subject to these constraints, the first level calls for a triple (ρ1, ρ2, δ)
maximizing the leader’s utility.
The problem is optimistic as, assuming that the second level admits many NE
(ρ1, ρ2) for the chosen δ, it calls for a pair (ρ1, ρ2) which, together with δ, maximizes
the leader’s utility. Notice that, while any triple (ρ1, ρ2, δ) ∈ Δ1×Δ2×Δ is a feasible
solution to the problem as long as the pair (ρ1, ρ2) is an NE in the game induced by δ,
Problem (1a)–(1c) calls for a triple (ρ1, ρ2, δ) which is optimal—as, if not, the leader
would prefer to change their strategy and (ρ1, ρ2, δ) would not be a LFNE.
In the pessimistic case, computing a P-LFNE amounts to solving to the following
problem:
(P-LFNE) max
δ∈Δ
min
(ρ1,ρ2)∈
Δ1×Δ2
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 δ
k (2a)
s.t. Constraints (1b), (1c). (2b)
This problem differs from its optimistic counterpart as, due to the assumption of
pessimism, the leader here maximizes the minimum value taken by their utility over
all pairs (ρ1, ρ2) which are NE in the followers’ game induced by δ—that is, for the
chosen δ, ρ1 and ρ2 always correspond to a NE which minimizes the leader’s utility.
4.3 Complexity results
As we will show, the optimization problem associated with the search problem of
computing an LFNE is both NP-hard and inapproximable in both versions (O-LFNE
and P-LFNE) in the LMFM case even with a single leader action (which implies
that the result also holds for the LPFM case). This follows from the NP-hardness
and inapproximability of the problem of computing, in a two-player game, a mixed-
strategy NE which maximizes the sum of the players’ utilities (the so-called social
welfare) (Conitzer and Sandholm 2008):
Proposition 1 (Conitzer and Sandholm 2008) The problem of computing a mixed-
strategy NE which maximizes the total players’ utility is NP-hard and it is not in
APX unless P = NP , even when the game is polymatrix.
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The result is based on the fact that, for any SAT instance, it is possible to build a
symmetric two-player game (U1, U2), either NF or PM, such that:
(i) there is a (pure-strategy) NE in which both players play their last action and receive
a utility equal to  > 0, where  is an arbitrarily small constant;
(ii) the game admits a (mixed-strategy) NE providing each player with a utility of m,
where m is the number of actions, if and only if the SAT instance is a YES instance.
This implies that, in any such game, finding an NE where the players achieve a utility
strictly larger than  would suffice to claim that the corresponding SAT instance is a
YES instance. It follows that one cannot decide in polynomial time whether such games
admit an NE providing the players with a utility strictly larger than  unless P = NP
as, if that were the case, YES instances of SAT could be decided in polynomial time.
This also shows that finding an NE which maximizes the social welfare (defined as the
total players’ utility) is not in APX . This is because the existence of an NE providing
the players with a total utility strictly greater than 2 would suffice to conclude that
the corresponding SAT instance admits answer YES.
We show that the result in Conitzer and Sandholm (2008) can be strengthened with
a simple observation:
Proposition 2 The problem of computing a mixed-strategy NE which maximizes the
total players’ utility is not in Poly-APX unless P = NP , even when the game is
polymatrix.
Proof Let  = 12m . On games corresponding to YES SAT instances (which admit an
NE with total utility 2m), an algorithm with approximation ratio 1
α
would yield an
NE of total utility at least 1
α
2m. Note that, if 1
α
2m > 2 (i.e., 1
α
> 
m
), the SAT
instance is proved to be a YES instance. Therefore, there cannot be a polynomial time
approximation algorithm with a factor better than 
m
= 12m m unless P = NP . Since
the reciprocal of this factor is superpolynomial, the problem is not in Poly-APX . unionsq
For the problem of computing an O/P-LFNE, we show the following result:
Proposition 3 The optimization problem associated with the search problem of com-
puting an O/P-LFNE in the LMFM and LPFM cases is NP-hard and it is not in
Poly-APX unless P = NP , even when the game is polymatrix.
Proof Let us consider the O-LFNE case first. Given a game with utilities (U1, U2)
and m actions per player as defined in Conitzer and Sandholm (2008), we construct a
3-player leader-follower polymatrix game where:
– the leader only has one action and utility matrices U f1 = U f2 =
[
1, . . . , 1, 12m
]
;
– player f1’s utility matrices are U f1 = 0 and U f1 f2 = U1;
– player f2’s utility matrices are U f2 = 0 and U f2 f1 = U2.
Due to having a single action, the presence of the leader is immaterial. (Note that,
therefore, the LMFM and LPFM cases coincide.) Therefore, the set of followers’
equilibria in the leader-follower game is the same as that of the original two-player
game. It follows that SAT has answer YES if and only if the leader-follower game
admits an equilibrium with leader’s utility strictly larger than 12m , as that corresponds
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to an NE in the followers’ game with utility strictly larger than  for each player. Along
the lines of the previous proof, an algorithm with approximation factor 1
α
would yield,
for a YES instance, a leader utility of at least 1
α
, allowing us to conclude that the
instance is a YES instance if 1
α
> 12m . This shows that the problem of computing an
O-LFNE is not in Poly-APX unless P = NP (even in polymatrix games).
For the computation of a P-LFNE, the reasoning is the same except for defining
U f1 = U f2 =
[ 1
2m ,
1
2m , . . . ,
1
2m , 1
]
. unionsq
We conclude the section by showing that deciding whether one of the leader’s
actions can be safely discarded is a hard problem, which implies that dominance-like
techniques often used in game theory to reduce the search space of an equilibrium-
computing algorithm are inapplicable.
Proposition 4 In the LMFM case, deciding whether an action of the leader is played
with strictly positive probability at an O/P-LFNE is NP-hard.
Proof Given a symmetric two-player game (U1, U2) with m actions as defined in
Conitzer and Sandholm (2008), we build a three-player game (U, U f1 , U f2) in which:
– the leader has two actions, while f1 and f2 have m actions each;
– when the leader plays their first action, the payoffs of all the players are 1/4;
– when the leader plays their second action, the payoffs of f1 and f2 are those in
(U1, U2) and the leader’s payoffs are 1 for all the actions of f1 and f2, except for
the combination composed of the last action of f1 and the last action of f2, in
which the leader’s payoff is 0.
We show that the first action of the leader can be safely discarded from the game
(U, U f1 , U f2) if and only if the game (U1, U2) admits a mixed-strategy NE providing
the players with a utility of m, which implies that deciding whether the first action
of the leader can be discarded is NP-hard. If the leader plays their first action, they
receive a utility of 1/4. If the leader plays their second action, the followers play the
best NE for the leader, which can be either (i) the pure-strategy NE in which both
play their last action providing the leader with a utility of 0 or (ii) if it exists, the
mixed-strategy NE providing the leader with a utility of 1. For any mixed strategy of
the leader, the behavior of the followers does not change w.r.t. the case in which the
leader plays their second action as a pure strategy. This is because, when the leader
randomizes between their two actions, the utility of the followers f1 and f2 is an
affine transformation (with positive coefficients) of U1 and U2, making them play
exactly as in the case where the leader plays their second action as a pure strategy.
Thus, at an optimistic LFNE the leader plays a pure strategy, playing their first action
if (U1, U2) does not admit a mixed-strategy NE and their second action if it does.
The first action of the leader can therefore be safely discarded if and only if (U1, U2)
admits a mixed-strategy NE providing the players with a utility of m.
The proof is analogous in the pessimistic case after interchanging the leader payoffs
of values 0 and 1. unionsq
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5 Optimistic case with leader in mixed and followers in mixed
(O-LMFM)
In this section, we focus on the optimistic setting in the general case where each player
is allowed to play mixed strategies. We propose three different exact mathematical
programming formulations for NF games and then illustrate how they can be simplified
for PM games.
5.1 Exact formulations for NF games
We report the three formulations illustrating how to derive each of them in sequence.
5.1.1 O-NF-LMFM-I
To obtain a single-level formulation for the problem, we proceed by applying a stan-
dard reformulation (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008) involving complementarity
constraints.
Let, for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2, U˜ i j1 :=
∑
k∈A U
i jk
1 δ
k and U˜ i j2 =
∑
k∈A U
i jk
2 δ
k be
the matrices of the followers’ game, parameterized by δ. According to Constraint (1b),
for (ρ1, ρ2) to be a NE ρ1 must be an optimal solution to the Linear Program (LP):
max
ρ1∈Δ1
{ ∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
U˜ i j1 ρ
i
1ρ
j
2
}
,
where U˜ i j1 ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 is a linear function of ρ1 if ρ2 is fixed. Since the LP is feasible and
bounded for any ρ2 ∈ Δ2, by complementary slackness we have that ρ1 ∈ Δ1 is
optimal if and only if there is a scalar v1 such that the following holds for all i ∈ A1:
(
v1 − ∑ j∈A2 U˜ i j1 ρ j2
)
ρi1 = 0
v1 ≥ ∑ j∈A2 U˜ i j1 ρ j2 .
v1 can be interpreted as the best-response value of follower 1, equal to the largest
utility the follower can achieve at an equilibrium. Applying a similar reasoning to ρ2,
we obtain that ρ2 ∈ Δ2 is optimal if and only if there is a scalar v2 such that the
following holds for all j ∈ A2:
(
v2 − ∑i∈A1 U˜
i j
2 ρ
i
1
)
ρ
j
2 = 0
v2 ≥ ∑i∈A1 U˜ i j2 ρi1.
We conclude that (ρ1, ρ2) is an NE if and only if there are v1, v2 ≥ 0 such that ρ1 and
ρ2 simultaneously satisfy these four conditions.
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After substituting for U˜1 and U˜2 their linear expressions in δ, we obtain the following
constraints for player 1 and for all i ∈ A1:
(
v1 − ∑ j∈A2
∑
k∈A U
i jk
1 ρ
j
2 δ
k
)
ρi1 = 0
v1 ≥ ∑ j∈A2
∑
k∈A U
i jk
1 ρ
j
2 δ
k .
For player 2 and for all j ∈ A2, we obtain:
(
v2 − ∑i∈A1
∑
k∈A U
i jk
2 ρ
i
1δ
k
)
ρ
j
2 = 0
v2 ≥
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δ
k .
By imposing such constraints in lieu of the two second-level argmax constraints of
Problem (1) (Constraints (1b)–(1c)), we obtain a continuous single-level formulation
with nonconvex trilinear terms.2 Overall, the formulation reads:
max
ρ1,ρ2,δ,v
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 δ
k (3)
s.t.
(
v1 −
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
j
2 δ
k
)
ρi1 = 0 ∀i ∈ A1 (4)
v1 ≥
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
j
2 δ
k ∀i ∈ A1 (5)
(
v2 −
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δ
k
)
ρ
j
2 = 0 ∀ j ∈ A2 (6)
v2 ≥
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δ
k ∀ j ∈ A2 (7)
∑
k∈A
δk = 1, δ ≥ 0 (8)
∑
i∈A f
ρif = 1, ρ f ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F (9)
v f ≥ 0 f ∈ F . (10)
The problem contains m1 + m2 cubic constraints, m1 + m2 quadratic constraints and
a cubic objective function.
2 Note that strong duality can be employed in place of complementary slackness. Preliminary experiments
suggest that the second option is computationally preferable.
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5.1.2 O-NF-LMFM-II
What we propose now is aimed at achieving a formulation which can be solved
more efficiently. Since each term of the complementarity constraints we introduced is
bounded from above and below, we can apply a simple reformulation along the lines of
Sandholm et al. (2005). Let s1 ∈ {0, 1}m1 and s2 ∈ {0, 1}m2 be the antisupport vectors
of ρ1 and ρ2, (i.e., two binary vectors with m1 and, respectively, m2 components each
of which has value 0 if and only if ρ1 and, respectively, ρ2 is strictly positive in that
component). It suffices to impose the following constraints for all i ∈ A1:
ρi1 ≤ 1 − si1
v1 −
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
j
2 δ
k ≤ Msi1
and the following ones for all j ∈ A2:
ρ
j
2 ≤ 1 − s j2
v2 −
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δ
k ≤ Ms j2 .
M is an upper bound on the entries of U1, U2. This way, while still retaining the
original trilinear objective function only bilinear constraints are needed.
We obtain the following reformulation:
max
ρ1,ρ2,δ,v,s
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk ρ
i
1ρ
j
2 δ
k (11)
s.t. v1 −
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
j
2 δ
k ≤ Msi1 ∀i ∈ A1 (12)
v2 −
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δ
k ≤ Ms j2 ∀ j ∈ A2 (13)
ρif ≤ 1 − sif ∀ f ∈ F, i ∈ A f (14)
s
j
f ∈ {0, 1} ∀ f ∈ F, j ∈ A f (15)
Constraints (5), (7), (8)–(10). (16)
At the cost of introducing binary variables, with this formulation we achieve fewer
nonlinearities: only 2m1 + 2m2 quadratic constraints and a cubic objective function.
5.1.3 O-NF-LMFM-III
Ultimately, we aim to solve the problem with spatial-branch-and-bound techniques,
such as those implemented in BARON and SCIP. The main strategy of such methods
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to handle nonlinearities is to isolate “simple” nonlinear terms (bilinear or trilinear in
our case) by shifting them into a new (so-called defining) constraint to which a convex
envelope is applied.
We propose to anticipate this reformulation, so to be able to derive some valid
constraints. First, we introduce:
(i) variable y jk2 and constraint y jk2 = ρ j2 δk for all j ∈ A2, k ∈ A,
(ii) variable yik1 and constraint yik1 = ρi1δk for all i ∈ A1, k ∈ A,
(iii) variable zi jk and constraint zi jk = ρi1 y jk2 for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, k ∈ A.
By substituting each bilinear and trilinear term with the newly introduced variables,
we then obtain a formulation which is linear everywhere, except for the defining
constraints themselves.
The advantage of carrying out this reformulation step a priori is that we can now
observe that, after introducing the new variables, the matrix {y jk2 } jk∈A2×A is, by
definition, the outer product of the stochastic vectors ρ2 and δ and, as such, is a
stochastic matrix itself. The same holds for the tensor {zi jk}i jk∈A1×A2×A , which is
the outer product of the vectors ρ1, ρ2, δ and, as such, is a stochastic tensor. This
implies the validity of the following three constraints:
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
yik1 = 1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
y jk2 = 1
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
zi jk = 1.
We remark that these inequalities are a subset of those that are obtained by applying
a relaxation-linearization technique à la Sherali and Adams (1990) to Constraints (8)
and (9).
The formulation that we obtain is the following one:
max
ρ1,ρ2,δ,v,s,y,z
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk z
i jk (17)
s.t. v1 ≥
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 y
jk
2 ∀i ∈ A1 (18)
v2 ≥
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 y
i j
1 ∀ j ∈ A2 (19)
v1 −
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 y
jk
2 ≤ Msi1 ∀i ∈ A1 (20)
v2 −
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 y
ik
1 ≤ Ms j2 ∀ j ∈ A2 (21)
yikf = ρif δk ∀k ∈ A, f ∈ F, i ∈ A f (22)
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zi jk = ρi1 y jk2 k ∈ A, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 (23)
∑
i∈A f
∑
k∈A
yikf = 1 ∀ f ∈ F (24)
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
zi jk = 1 (25)
yi jf ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F, i ∈ A f , k ∈ A (26)
zi jk ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, k ∈ A (27)
Constraints(8)–(10), (14)–(15). (28)
Overall, we obtain m(m1 + m2) + mm1m2 quadratic constraints and a linear
objective function, yielding a tighter formulation than O-NF-LMFM-II, as we will
show computationally.
5.2 Exact formulations for PM games
We illustrate how the three formulations we proposed can be substantially simplified
for PM games.
5.2.1 O-PM-LMFM-I
In PM games, the expected utility for follower 1 corresponding to an action i ∈ A1
(which is a trilinear function for NF games with n = 3 and of order n in general) is
defined as the following linear function (which is linear for any n and, in particular,
for n = 3):
∑
k∈A
Uik1δ
k +
∑
j∈A2
Ui j12ρ
j
2 .
The leader’s utility is the following function, bilinear for any n:
∑
k∈A
∑
i∈A1
Uik1ρ
i
1δ
k +
∑
k∈A
∑
j∈A2
U jk2 ρ
j
2 δ
k .
As a consequence, the PM counterpart to formulation O-NF-LMFM-I reads:
max
ρ1,ρ2,δ,v
∑
k∈A
∑
i∈A1
Uik1ρ
i
1δ
k +
∑
k∈A
∑
j∈A2
U jk2 ρ
j
2 δ
k (29)
s.t. v1 ≥
∑
k∈A
Uik1δ
k +
∑
j∈A2
Ui j12ρ
j
2 ∀i ∈ A1 (30)
v2 ≥
∑
k∈A
U jk2 δ
k +
∑
i∈A1
Ui j21ρ
i
1 ∀ j ∈ A2 (31)
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(
v1 −
∑
k∈A
Uik1δ
k +
∑
j∈A2
Ui j12ρ
j
2
)
ρi1 = 0 ∀i ∈ A1 (32)
(
v2 −
∑
k∈A
U jk2 δ
k +
∑
i∈A1
Ui j21ρ
i
1
)
ρ
j
2 = 0 ∀ j ∈ A2 (33)
Constraints (8)–(10. (34)
Differently from the NF case, this formulation only contains m1 + m2 quadratic
constraints and a quadratic objective (as Constraints (5) and (7) become linear here,
while Constraints (4) and (6) and Objective (3) become quadratic).
5.2.2 O-PM-LMFM-II
Applying for the PM case the same reformulation we carried out in O-NF-LMFM-II,
we obtain:
max
ρ1,ρ2,δ,v,s
∑
k∈A
∑
i∈A1
Uik1ρ
i
1δ
k +
∑
k∈A
∑
j∈A2
U jk2 ρ
j
2 δ
k (35)
s.t. v1 −
∑
k∈A
Uik1δ
k +
∑
j∈A2
Ui j12ρ
j
2 ≤ Msi1 ∀i ∈ A1 (36)
v2 −
∑
k∈A
U jk2 δ
k +
∑
i∈A1
Ui j21ρ
i
1 ≤ Ms j2 ∀ j ∈ A2 (37)
Constraints (8)–(10), (14)–(15), (30)–(31). (38)
Besides the binary variables, this formulation contains only linear constraints and
a quadratic objective.
5.2.3 O-PM-LMFM-III
Similarly to O-NF-LMFM-III, this formulation is derived by reformulating each multi-
linear term in O-PM-LMFM-II. In the latter, the only nonlinearity is in the objective
function. Therefore, O-PM-LMFM-III is obtained by just reformulating the products
δiρ
j
f it contains for all f ∈ F and j ∈ A f , adding valid constraints identical to those
we added to O-NF-LMFM-III. We obtain:
max
ρ1,ρ2,δ,v,s,y
∑
k∈A
∑
i∈A1
Uik1 y
ik
1 +
∑
k∈A
∑
j∈A2
U jk2 y
jk
2 (39)
s.t. Constraints (8)–(10), (14)–(15), (22), (24), (26), (30)–(31), (36)–(37).
(40)
Similarly to O-NF-LMFM-III, O-PM-LMFM-III is completely linear except for
the m(m1 + m2) defining quadratic Constraints (22).
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6 Pessimistic case with leader in mixed and followers in mixed
(P-LMFM)
Unless P = NP , it is clear that there is no single-level formulation of polynomial
size (in terms of variables and constraints) for the problem of computing a pessimistic
LFNE. This is because, given a triple δ, ρ1, ρ2, a single-level reformulation of poly-
nomial size for the problem would allow for checking whether, for the given δ, the
(ρ1, ρ2) pair yields not just an NE (this can be checked in polynomial time by inspect-
ing polynomially many constraints) but an optimal one. That is, it would allow us to
verify in polynomial time whether a given solution to an NP-hard problem is optimal,
which cannot be done in general unless P = NP .
For this reason, we adopt a different approach here, designing a heuristic
method to tackle the pessimistic case based on a black-box solver coupled with
an exact oracle. While the method is conceived to tackle the pessimistic case,
it can also be used for the optimistic one (as we show in Computational results
section).
The method is based on a radial basis function (RBF) estimation which relies on the
solver RBFOpt (Costa et al. 2015). The idea is of exploring the leader’s strategy space
(variables δ) with a direct search which iteratively builds an RBF approximation of the
objective function relying on the solution of an oracle formulation which is responsible
for carrying out the objective function evaluation.
Given any incumbent value δˆ, the oracle solves the (NF or PM) second-level problem
exactly after imposing δ = δˆ. For NF games, the oracle formulation we use is similar to
O-NF-LMFM-III, employing a different reformulation with auxiliary variables y jk =
ρ
j
1 ρ
k
2 , which yields a tighter reformulation than the original one in O-NF-LMFM-III
when δ is given (as in this case). Crucially, in this formulation the sign of the objective
function has to be changed so to produce a pair (ρ1, ρ2) which minimizes the leader’s
objective function (rather than maximizing it) for the given δ = δˆ.
The oracle formulation for the optimistic and pessimistic cases reads as follows (±
indicates that the sign of the objective function has to be flipped from + to − in the
pessimistic case):
max
ρ1,ρ2,v,s,y
±
∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk y
i j δˆk (41)
s.t. v1 ≥
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
j
2 δˆ
k ∀i ∈ A1 (42)
v2 ≥
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δˆ
k ∀ j ∈ A2 (43)
v1 −
∑
j∈A2
∑
k∈A
Ui jk1 ρ
j
2 δˆ
k ≤ Msi1 ∀i ∈ A1 (44)
v2 −
∑
i∈A1
∑
k∈A
Ui jk2 ρ
i
1δˆ
k ≤ Ms j2 ∀ j ∈ A2 (45)
yi j = ρi1ρ j2 ∀i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 (46)
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∑
i∈A1
∑
j∈A2
yi j = 1 (47)
yi jf ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F, i ∈ A f , k ∈ A (48)
Constraints (8)–(10), (14)–(15). (49)
Besides the defining constraints for yi j , the other parts of the formulation are all
linear.
For PM games, we can directly use formulation O-PM-LMFM-II: Since each of
the nonlinear terms in O-PM-LMFM-II is bilinear and it involves δ, when δ is fixed
to δˆ the formulation corresponds to a mixed-integer linear program (MILP).
7 Optimistic case with leader in pure and followers inmixed (O-LPFM)
We focus now on the case in which the leader is restricted to pure strategies.
7.1 Exact formulations for NF and PF games
As it is clear, in the LPFM case the problem can be solved by using one of the
formulations we proposed after imposing δ ∈ {0, 1}m . With a binary δ, though, we
can obtain different formulations which contain fewer nonlinearities. We present them
here for the NF and PM cases. We only consider the formulations denoted by III since
they turn out to be easier to solve in practice (as we will see in Computational results
section).
7.1.1 O-NF-LPFM-III
For δ ∈ {0, 1}m , the quadratic defining Constraints (22) in O-NF-LMFM-III can be
dropped in favor of the following three linear constraints:
yikf ≤ δk ∀k ∈ A, f ∈ F, i ∈ A f (50)
yikf ≤ ρif ∀k ∈ A, f ∈ F, i ∈ A f (51)
yikf ≥ δk + ρif − 1 ∀k ∈ A, f ∈ F, i ∈ A f . (52)
Together with yikf ≥ 0, these constraints constitute the so-called McCormick enve-
lope (McCormick 1976) of the set {(yikf , δk, ρif ) ∈ [0, 1]3 : yikf = δkρif }. When either
δk ∈ {0, 1} or ρif ∈ {0, 1}, the envelope yields an exact reformulation (Al-Khayyal and
Falk 1983). The resulting formulation is obtained from O-NF-LMFM-III by dropping
the quadratic (defining) Constraints (22) and substituting for them the linear Con-
straints (50)–(52). The only nonlinear constraints still present in the formulation are
Constraints (23).
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7.1.2 O-PM-LPFM-III
In O-PM-LMFM-III, the only nonlinearities are due to the quadratic (defining)
Constraints (22). Due to δ ∈ {0, 1}m , by applying the McCormick envelope via Con-
straints (50)–(52) we can remove all the nonlinearities from the problem, obtaining an
MILP.
7.2 O-NF/PM-LPFM-implicit-enumeration
When δ ∈ {0, 1}m , an LFNE can also be found by solving m times one of our for-
mulations. It suffices to change the sign of the objective function in the pessimistic
case, iteratively fixing δ = ek (where ek is the all zero vector with a single 1 in
position k) and selecting the best outcome over all the iterations as the solution
to the problem. While this method is correct for both variants (optimistic and pes-
simistic), in the optimistic case we can design a better algorithm, which we now
introduce.
The main idea of the algorithm is pruning the search space A so to solve fewer
subproblems thanks to a bounding technique. For each of the leader’s actions, we
compute the utility they would obtain if the followers played a correlated equilibrium
(CE) (which can be computed in polynomial time via linear programming; see Shoham
and Leyton-Brown (2008)). Since the set of correlated strategies is a (strict) superset
of that of mixed strategies, its computation yields an upper bound (UB). We can thus
iterate over i ∈ A and solve one of our formulations with δ = ek (where ek is the
unit vector with a single 1 in position k) only if the UB with δ = ek is better than the
best solution found thus far.
The algorithm reads:
1: for k ∈ A do
2: U B(k) = BestCorrelatedEquilibrium(k)
3: end for
4: A = DescendingSort(A, U B)
5: L B = −∞
6: for k ∈ A and U B(k) > L B do
7: L B = max{L B, Utility(ek)}
8: end for
BestCorrelatedEquilibrium(k) computes a UB with δ = ek by computing
a CE in polynomial time via linear programming, along the lines of Shoham
and Leyton-Brown (2008). After sorting the leader’s actions in decreasing order
of UB via DescendingSort(A, U B), the algorithm iterates over A, comput-
ing with Utili t y(ek) the exact leader’s utility corresponding to playing the pure
action δ = ek only if U B(k) is sufficiently promising. In our implementa-
tion, Utili t y(ek) solves the same oracle formulations adopted in the black-box
method.
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8 A note on solution approaches for the remaining cases
For completeness, in this section we address the remaining cases that are obtained by
restricting either the leader or the followers to pure strategies. Since all these cases
can be solved fairly easily with only one exception, we will not consider them in
Computational results section.
8.1 O/P-LFNE with leader in pure and followers in pure (O/P-LPFP)
The case where both the leader and the followers can only play pure strategies is
trivial in both the optimistic and pessimistic versions. For its solution, one can, first,
construct each of the m3 possible outcomes of the three players and, then, discard
all the outcomes where the pair of followers’ strategies do not induce an NE for the
pure leader strategy they contain. For the optimistic case, it then suffices to compare
the leader’s utility corresponding to all the outcomes which have not been discarded,
identifying one where the leader’s utility is maximized. For the pessimistic case, an
extra step is needed as one has to, first, group all the outcomes by leader strategy and
then identify, in each group, an outcome corresponding to the smallest leader utility.
An equilibrium is found by selecting, among all the remaining outcomes (at most one
per leader’s pure strategy) one which maximizes the leader’s utility.
8.2 O/P-LFNE with leader in mixed and followers in pure (O/P-LMFP)
In the optimistic setting, the case in which only the followers are restricted to pure
strategies can be solved by solving m2 linear programming problems, one per follow-
ers’ outcome. In each problem, we only have to impose best-response constraints on
the followers’ utilities guaranteeing that there is a leader’s strategy δ for which the
chosen outcome is an NE, maximizing the leader’s utility at that outcome for δ. The
follower’s outcome and the corresponding δ yielding the largest leader utility is then
an O-LFNE.
It is not difficult to see that the previous algorithm (which, overall, runs in poly-
nomial time) is not correct in the pessimistic case. This is not surprising since, as
shown in Coniglio et al. (2017, 2018), the optimization problem corresponding to the
equilibrium-finding problem is NP-hard in the pessimistic case even with follow-
ers restricted to pure strategies. For its solution, we can resort to the same methods
proposed in this paper for the LMFM case, simply requiring ρ1 and ρ2 to be binary.
9 Computational results
For our computational experiments, we adopt a test bed composed of instances mainly
taken from two GAMUT (Nudelman et al. 2004) classes: Uniform RandomGames (NF
games) and PolymatrixGames (PM games), generated with payoffs in [0, 100].
For simplicity, we assume that all the players have the same number of actions m,
i.e., that m p = m for all p ∈ N .
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This is w.l.o.g., as one can always add extra actions to a player with a payoff small
enough to guarantee that such actions will never be played at an equilibrium.
We experiment on games of increasing size of m and n, with m ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 10} ∪
{15, . . . , 25} when n = 3 (2 followers) and m ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 10} when n ≥ 4 (3 or
more followers). We generate 10 instances per value of m, n and game class.
For the experiments on NF games in the LMFM case, we also consider eight
GAMUT classes of structured normal-form games, BertrandOligopoly, Bidirectional-
LEGs, MinimumEffortGames, RandomGraphicalGames, DispersionGames, Covari-
antGames, TravelersDilemma and UniformLEGs, generating 10 instances with 2
followers and m = 8 actions per player for each of them.
Throughout the section, the results of our experiments are compared w.r.t. com-
puting time (in seconds) and (multiplicative) optimality gap.3 For both values, we
report the arithmetic average for each game class and value of m and n over the 10
corresponding instances. In all the boxplots that we report, the red dash indicates the
median, the box extends from the 25th to the 75th percentile, and dotted lines denote
the whole sample distribution. Outliers are highlighted with a red mark.
We adopt five solvers: BARON and SCIP (for globally optimal solutions to every
formulation, apart from O-PM-LPFM-III which is an MILP), CPLEX (for globally
optimal solutions to O-PM-LPFM-III, as well as to the oracle formulation for PM
games in the implicit-enumeration and black-box methods), SNOPT (for locally opti-
mal solutions to the formulations with purely continuous variables) and RBFOpt as
the backbone of our black-box heuristic for pessimistic cases of LFNE. (We will,
nevertheless, also experiment with it for some optimistic variants.) The O-NF-LPFM-
implicit-enumeration algorithm is implemented in C. The experiments are run on a
UNIX computer with a dual quad-core CPU at 2.33 GHz, equipped with 8 GB of
RAM. Each algorithm is run using a single thread within a time limit of 3600 seconds.
For the exact methods, we halt the execution whenever the optimality gap reaches
10−12%.4
9.1 O-NF-LMFM-I, II, and III (n = 3)
We compare the different NF formulations when solved with BARON and SCIP. For
RandomGames instances, the average computing time and optimality gap for each
combination of formulation and solver is reported in Fig. 1 as a function of m.
The results obtained with the two solvers are quite different. BARON better per-
forms on O-NF-LMFM-I (the formulation with purely continuous variables), while
SCIP better performs on O-NF-LMFM-III (the “reformulated” formulation which con-
tains binary variables introduced to remove nonquadratic terms from O-NF-LMFM-II,
3 The optimality gap is defined as min
{
UB−LB
LB 100, 10
5
}
%, where LB and UB are, resp., the largest
lower bound (corresponding to the best feasible solution) and the smallest upper bound found by the solver
within the time limit. The min operator prevents an unbounded value for LB = 0. An optimality gap of 105
highlights that the method fails to produce a useful solution as, due to the payoffs being in [0, 100], any
strategy of the leader can achieve, at least, a utility of 0.
4 Preliminary experiments with four tolerance values, namely 10−12%, 10−9%, 10−6% and 10−3%,
showed, for a larger tolerance, a negligible reduction in computing time by, at most and only in few
instances, 2.5% with SCIP and 7.0% with BARON. The stricter tolerance was thus preferred.
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Fig. 1 Computing times and optimality gaps obtained with the NF-LMFM formulations
as well as extra valid constraints). These results suggest that the formulation which
is solved more efficiently with each solver is O-NF-LMFM-I with BARON and O-
NF-LMFM-III with SCIP. These results are in line with the general computational
behavior of BARON and SCIP, as the former tends to exhibiting a better performance
on highly nonlinear and mostly continuous problems, whereas the latter becomes more
efficient as the number of integer/binary variables of the problem increases.
Further inspecting Fig. 1, we notice that, with SCIP, O-NF-LMFM-III always
outperforms O-NF-LMFM-II. This shows that SCIP is incapable of automatically
constructing the reformulation obtained with O-NF-LMFM-III.
As to the computing times, the largest m for which at least a game is solved to
optimality by BARON within the time limit is m = 8 for O-NF-LMFM-I and m = 7
for the other formulations. With SCIP, we reach m = 9 with O-NF-LMFM-III and
m = 3 with the other ones. In particular, SCIP with O-NF-LMFM-III always requires
a shorter computing time than BARON with O-NF-LMFM-I for every number of
actions.
In terms of optimality gaps, SCIP remarkably outperforms BARON. As one can
see in Fig. 1b, d, the gap achieved by BARON with O-NF-LMFM-I reaches 105%
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Fig. 2 Computing times obtained when solving formulation O-NF-LMFM-I with BARON and formulation
O-NF-LMFM-III with SCIP for different GAMUT classes of structured games
when m ≥ 20. This is due to the solver returning an LB of 0 due to failing find
a feasible solution in the time limit. Differently, the gap achieved by SCIP with O-
NF-LMFM-III is below 15% for m up to m = 25. Such results suggest that, for
games of this size, one can always achieve an almost constant gap, contrarily to what
the intrinsic difficulty of the problem would suggest, namely an exponential quality
degradation as the number of actions grows. Moreover, these results show that SCIP
with O-NF-LMFM-III always finds a feasible solution (an NE) for the followers’
game and for some leader’s strategy, differently from the other pairs of solver and
formulation.
These observations are substantially confirmed when experimenting with the same
solver/formulation pair on the eight structured classes of NF games. The average
computing times reported in Fig. 2 are indeed in line with the trends we observed for
RandomGames, with SCIP outperforming BARON most of the times (on average).
This trend becomes different when considering DispersionGames, where SCIP per-
forms less efficiently than for the other classes of games, achieving computing times
which are considerably larger than those obtained with BARON. This is due to the
solver failing to solve two game instances within the time limit. This can be better
observed in Figure 3 which reports the computing times only for the instances that are
solved to optimality with the two solvers, as well as the percentage of such instances. In
particular, we observe that SCIP solves 91.875% of the instances on average, whereas
BARON only solves 81.25%.
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Fig. 3 Computing times only considering games for which the computations terminated; the percentage of
instances solved to optimality is reported on top of each bar
9.2 O-PM-LMFM-I, II and III (n = 3)
In Fig. 4, we report the computing times and the optimality gaps obtained with
SCIP for games of the GAMUT class PolymatrixGames. Since the results obtained
with BARON are similar to those we illustrated for NF games, we omit them for the
sake of brevity.
Within the time limit, the largest m for which at least an instance is solved to
optimality is m = 15. For m ≤ 10, all instances are solved to within a gap of 0 (within
the numerical tolerance we set). In particular, the optimality gap is always below 15%
for instances with up to m = 25, showing a trend which is substantially less steep than
that for NF games. This suggests that PM games are, as expected, easier to solve.
9.3 O-NF-LMFM-I, local optimization (n = 3)
In Fig. 5, we report the experimental results obtained with SNOPT for RandomGames
using formulation O-NF-LMFM-I. Due to the local optimization nature of the solver
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Fig. 4 Computing times and optimality gaps with SCIP with O-PM-LMFM formulations
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
103
104
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
n. of actions
Ti
m
e 
[s
]
(a) Average times (SNOPT)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
3 4 5 6 7
n. of actions
G
ap
 [%
]
(b) Average gaps (SNOPT)
Fig. 5 Computing times and LBOPT ratios obtained with SNOPT with O-NF-LMFM-I within 30 random
restarts
for nonconvex problems, to obtain statistically more relevant results we run 30 restarts
with different initial starting solutions, sampled uniformly at random from the sim-
plices of the strategies of the three agents, and return the best solution found.
Figure 5a shows that the computing times with SNOPT (cumulated over the 30
random restarts) are much shorter than the computing times required by BARON and
SCIP, allowing for solving (to a local optimum) almost all the instances with m = 20
within the time limit. Differently, as shown in Fig. 5b the quality of the solutions
returned by SNOPT (measured as their ratio over the value of an optimal solution found
by SCIP or BARON) is rather poor even with very few actions. Indeed, the median of
the ratios is between 10 and 20% for games with up to m = 7. This emphasizes the
effectiveness of our approach based on spatial-branch-and-bound methods.
9.4 O-NF/PM-LMFM-III (n ≥ 4)
In Table 1, we report the average computing times obtained with SCIP when employ-
ing formulations O-NF-LMFM-III and O-PM-LMFM-III for games with 4 players
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Table 1 Computing times (in seconds) with SCIP and O-NF/PM-LMFM-III, within a time limit of 3600 s
n/m 2 3 4 5
Normal-form games
3 0.06 0.20 0.92 23.79
4 0.19 8.274 142.66 1304.45
5 278.06 409.78 2016.97 —
6 172.90 2350.95 2212.95 —
n/m 5 6 7 8 9 10
Polymatrix games
3 0.24 2.17 1.87 7.31 24.45 194.71
4 4.84 10.85 121.57 247.84 622.72 1947.54
5 7.51 90.83 332.04 1982.77 2396.01 2175.29
6 10.31 1169.50 2062.75 — — —
or more. In the time limit, we can solve NF games with up to m = 5 for n ≤ 4
(corresponding to up to mn = 625 different outcomes and nmn = 2500 different
payoffs) and up to m = 4 for n ≤ 6 (corresponding to up to mn = 4096 outcomes
and nmn = 24, 576 payoffs). Quite interestingly, with our methods we can tackle
instances of a size comparable to that of the largest instances used in Porter et al.
(2008) (such instances are generated with GAMUT (Nudelman et al. 2004) and are
comparable to the ones in our test bed) to evaluate a set of algorithms proposed to
find an NE (in a single-level problem), in spite of our problem being clearly harder
(as it admits the former as a subproblem). With PM games, our algorithms scale much
better, allowing for finding exact solutions to PM games with up to m = 10 for n ≤ 5
and up to m = 7 for n ≤ 6.
9.5 O/P-NF/PM-LMFM-blackBox
When experimenting with the black-box method, we first consider the optimistic case
for NF games as, for it, we can compare the quality of the solutions we find to either
the optimal solution value or its tightest upper bound. Namely, we compare O-NF-
LMFM-blackBox to O-NF-LMFM-III, the latter solved with SCIP within the time
limit. The results are reported in Fig. 6.
In Fig. 6a, we observe, on average and for m ≤ 10, that the black-box method
yields solutions to within 90% of the optimal ones found with SCIP. This suggests
that the method might be sufficiently accurate. As shown in Fig. 6b, for m ≥ 10 the
burden of calling SCIP to solve the oracle formulation becomes too large, making the
black-box algorithm impractical.
An interesting result, see Fig. 6a, concerns the gap between the utility of the leader
at an optimistic LFNE or at a pessimistic LFNE. On the instances solved to optimality
(m ≤ 5), where we can verify the quality of the heuristic solutions, we see that the gap
is rather small, suggesting that, in RandomGames instances generated with GAMUT,
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Fig. 7 Performance of the black-box approach for O/P-PM-LMFM compared to O-PM-LMFM-III
the leader can manage to force the followers to play a strategy which provides the
leader with a utility not dramatically smaller than that which they would obtain in an
optimistic LFNE.
In Fig. 7, we report analogous results obtained with polymatrix games. In the time
limit, we compare O-PM-LMFM-III solved with SCIP to O-PM-LMFM-blackBox.
Differently from the NF case, Fig. 7b shows that, for PM games, the computing time
needed to solve the oracle formulation (which is an MILP in this case) is much smaller
and scales much better with m. Except for the case of m = 2, Fig. 7a allows us to
draw comparable conclusions to those that we have drawn for the NF case, with the
leader achieving, in the pessimistic case, solutions that are not too far away from the
corresponding optimistic ones w.r.t. their utility.
9.6 O-NF/PM-LPFM and O-NF/PM-implicit-enumeration (n = 3)
Lastly, we focus on the case where the leader is restricted to pure strategies. We
report the results in terms of computing times obtained by imposing δ ∈ {0, 1}m in
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Fig. 8 Computing times on NF/PM-LPFM instances with O-NF/PM-LPFM-III (a/c) and O-NF/PM-LPFM-
implicit-enumeration (b/d), using SCIP/CPLEX
O-NF/PM-LPFM-III with SCIP for RandomGames in Fig. 8a, b and with CPLEX for
PolymatrixGames (for which the formulation becomes an MILP) in Fig. 8c, d. Interest-
ingly, by imposing a binary δ to tackle the LPFM case the size of the largest instances
solvable within the time limit increases from m = 9 to m = 13 in RandomGames and
from m = 15 to m = 25 for PolymatrixGames when compared to the LMFM case.
For both RandomGames and PolymatrixGames, a dramatic performance improve-
ment is obtained with O-NF/PM-LPFM-implicit-enumeration: with it, the size of the
largest instance that we can solve increases from m = 13 to m = 20 for RandomGames
and from m = 25 to m = 50 for PolymatrixGames. As expected, the computing times
for PolymatrixGames are much smaller (due to only requiring the solution of an MILP
at each step), allowing us to solve to optimality much larger instances.
10 Conclusions and future work
We have studied game-theoretic leader-follower (Stackelberg) situations with a bilevel
structure where multiple followers play a Nash equilibrium once the leader has com-
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mitted to a strategy. After analyzing the complexity of the problem, we have provided
different algorithms and mathematical programming formulations to find an equilib-
rium for the optimistic case as well as a heuristic black-box method for the pessimistic
case. We have conducted a thorough experimental evaluation of the different meth-
ods we have proposed, using various optimization solvers. Our experiments suggest
that spatial-branch-and-bound solvers can be used as effective solution methods when
coupled with our formulations, providing a reasonably good optimality gap even for
large games.
Future works include the study of structured games, with focus on understanding
how the specific structure of a game could be exploited to obtain easier to solve
formulations (as we did for polymatrix games in this work).
Moreover, it would be of interest to study the adaptation of our techniques to
succinct games (whose normal-form representation has exponential size) relying on
cutting plane methods to cope with the presence of exponentially many best-response
constraints, possibly using notions of diversity and bound improvement within the
separation problem, see Amaldi et al. (2010, 2014), Coniglio and Tieves (2015), to
achieve a faster convergence.
It would also be of interest to combine state-of-the-art equilibrium-finding algo-
rithms for such games with methods similar to the black-box one we have proposed,
which would directly benefit from the existence of an efficient equilibrium-finding
algorithm for reoptimizing the followers’ problem after changing the leader’s strat-
egy.
Future works also include the study of equilibrium-finding methods based on sup-
port enumeration, understanding, in particular, whether games which admit Nash
equilibria of small support in the case without a leader would still admit small support
equilibria in the Stackelberg case.
Among the challenging problems that we are interested to address in the future,
we mention the design of algorithms to find an equilibrium when the followers play
either a strong Nash equilibrium, a strong correlated equilibrium or a solution concept
defined in cooperative game theory.
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